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Professor Siegan maintained that the Constitution protects economic 
liberty, which he described as “the right to produce and distribute goods 
and services.”1  As is so often the case with the Constitution, the interesting 
question is not whether it pursues some desirable goal, but how it does 
so, and how much.  I will suggest that the Constitution as drafted does 
indeed take many steps to ensure that the people will be able to produce 
and distribute goods and services in a relatively free market based on 
private property and freedom of contract.  It does so, however, the way it 
pursues most of its ultimate goals, indirectly.  The Constitution provides 
 
 * D. Lurton Massee, Jr., Professor of Law and Horace and Grace L. Doherty 
Charitable Foundation Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law, on 
leave in 2008 as Counselor on International Law to the Legal Adviser, United States 
Department of State.  The views expressed here are solely those of the author, who 
wishes to thank the other participants at the symposium at which an earlier version of 
this paper was presented. 
 1. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION 41 (1987). 
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for the common defense, not by saying that there shall be a common 
defense, but through a series of much more concrete steps ranging from 
Congress’s power to raise and support armies to limitations on the 
states’ capacity to do so, and thereby embroil the rest of the country in 
war.2  It establishes justice, not by stating that  there shall be justice, but 
through a series of provisions that deal with the courts and judicial 
matters.3  And it pursues its first goal of all, to form a more perfect 
Union, not by saying that there shall be one, but by forming a more 
perfect Union.4  That is how the Constitution protects economic liberties. 
Section I of this paper presents a positive account of the Constitution 
based on descriptive claims that I hope are relatively uncontroversial.  It 
is positive in this sense: it provides an explanation of the Constitution in 
terms of the purposes that would have led reasonable drafters to produce 
it.  As the topic of this symposium is the constitutional protection of 
economic liberty, I ask how a reasonable group of drafters, at the time 
the Constitution’s provisions were written, could have adopted those 
provisions in order to foster a free economy.  That produces an account 
of how the Constitution was designed to ensure economic freedom.  The 
dominating theme is that the Constitution does so without taking the 
most obvious and direct step in that direction, which would be to provide 
the basic private rights that together constitute economic liberty.  Instead, at 
a number of important points, the Constitution takes those rights for 
granted, as already existing under state law, and reinforces them without 
simply determining their content. 
Section II is interpretive, making claims about the meaning of the 
Constitution.  It takes issue with Professor Siegan, arguing that the 
Constitution gives economic interests hardly any protection in the form 
that we associate with guarantees of individuals rights.  This section 
defends the position that the Constitution does not itself provide the 
legal rules that establish private rights to property and contract, nor does 
it strongly constrain what the states and Congress may do when they 
create, change, and regulate those rights.  Section II focuses mainly on 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
which Professor Siegan found powerful constitutional safeguards for 
economic freedom, and maintains that the Clause operates indirectly, by 
requiring equality among citizens, and not directly on the substance of 
state private law.5 
 
 2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 4. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 77–79. 
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Section III is historical and normative.  It uses the country’s history 
under the Constitution to approach the question whether it would be 
desirable for the Constitution to protect economic liberty more directly, 
or, if one agrees with Professor Siegan, whether it is desirable for the 
Constitution to protect economic liberty in the direct manner it does.  I 
give some reasons to believe that it would not be. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION’S INDIRECT APPROACH TO ECONOMIC LIBERTY 
A. Federal and State Power and a Free Economy 
By economic liberty, I mean a legal system in which decisions about 
production and consumption are made by private individuals, not collectively 
through government.  In order for individuals to make economic decisions, 
they must have control over resources and be able to make agreements 
concerning those resources and their activities, which means that the 
government must protect private property and enable people to bind 
themselves through contracts.  Property and contract are, in a manner of 
speaking, forms of public power.  Economic liberty exists when other 
forms of public power, which would transfer operational control from 
private people to the state, are limited. 
In order to decide whether there is economic liberty, and what the 
Constitution does about it, it is thus necessary to consider both the 
foundational private legal advantages of property and contract and the 
powers of government to impose additional controls.  Under the American 
Constitution, the first question concerning economic freedom involves 
the allocation of those powers between the states and the national 
government. 
Federalism, the Constitution’s fundamental feature, has several facets.  
Probably the most familiar to students of constitutional law is the 
principle of enumerated federal power: the national government is not 
omnicompetent, but rather has only the particular powers granted to it.6  
Next most familiar is the political autonomy of the states.  State 
governments are not regional departments of the national government.7  
They have their own constitutional powers derived directly from popular 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 7. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that 
Congress may not require that state officers execute federal law). 
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sovereignty, and the power of the national government to regulate them 
as such is quite limited. 
Less familiar, though as important as the air we breathe, is the 
converse of enumerated federal power and a complement to the political 
autonomy of the states.  Each state is a complete political and legal 
system, at least as to internal matters, and is not dependent on a higher 
level of government.8  That principle, combined with the limited grants 
of national power, means that the legal foundations of economic 
freedom are found in state law.  State law, not federal law, creates the 
legal rules that provide basic rights of property and contract and 
protections thereof, for example through the law of torts.9  To know how 
an individual acquires property in Virginia and makes arrangements 
about it with other individuals, one looks to the law of Virginia, not the 
United States.  Moreover, the states have substantial power to regulate 
private economic transactions.  That arrangement is secured by the Federal 
Constitution through the limited ability of the national government to 
legislate on those topics and its very limited ability to command the 
states in their legislation. 
That structure protects economic liberty, in the sense in which I am 
interested, if reasonable Constitution drafters could have adopted it for 
that purpose.  I believe that they could have and indeed to a substantial 
extent did. 
It is tempting to think that the reason most questions concerning 
economic rights were left to the states by the Constitution’s drafters is 
simply that the states already existed as complete legal systems and 
consolidation was not on the agenda.  No one took seriously the possibility 
of simply replacing the states with a single government that would, 
among other things, prescribe the basic rules of private ownership and 
 
 8. The people of the United States constitute one nation, under one government,  
and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested, 
is supreme.  On the other hand, the people of each State compose a State, 
having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential to 
separate and independent existence.  The States disunited might continue to 
exist.  Without the States in union there could be no such political body as the 
United States.   
Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869).   
Nowhere is the theory and practice of American federalism more significantly 
revealed than in the constitutions of the states.  These constitutions assume 
responsibility for dealing, and claim authority to deal, with the whole gamut of 
problems cast up out of the flux of everyday life in the state, save only in the 
particular respects in which the Federal Constitution or statutes deprive the 
states of any competence whatever or provide for an overriding or displacing 
federal law.  
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
489, 491 (1954). 
 9. Hart, supra note 8, at 491. 
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trade.  But there are reasons consolidation was not considered—reasons 
that justify the Framers’ decision—that I will sketch presently. 
It is also tempting to think that, in any event, the structure I have 
described, however it came to be adopted, simply cannot qualify as 
constitutional protection of economic rights.  Today, it is natural to think 
that constitutional protection of any right simply means that the United 
States Constitution contains a provision, enforced by the judiciary and 
ultimately interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, that 
limits the governmental power of the national or state governments, or 
both.  That is certainly the kind of constitutional protection of rights that 
is most discussed by contemporary scholars of constitutional law, but 
here as elsewhere, synecdoche is a trope and not a literal description; the 
part with which we are most familiar is not the whole.  If a constitutional 
arrangement significantly increases the likelihood that certain legal 
advantages will be available, it protects them. 
At the time of the framing, as today, the states were democracies with 
their own constitutions and their own legal systems based on the common 
law but with adaptations to local conditions.  Those legal systems secured 
private rights of property and contract.  Those constitutions established 
and secured democracy.  The greater political entity that the states in 
union form, the United States, is also a constitutional democracy with a 
legal system that rests on private property and contract—because it is 
composed of the legal systems of the states.  The justification of the 
Constitution’s arrangement, with respect to the security of economic 
freedom, thus must be found in an argument in favor of decentralization 
on these topics. 
That argument is straightforward and has been well known to Americans 
from the founding until today.  Conditions, especially economic conditions, 
vary from state to state, and legal arrangements should vary with them.  
It is commonplace that legal arrangements governing water ownership 
and use should vary with topography, differing from the rainy East to the 
arid West.10  A part of the country with much manufacturing might find 
it worthwhile to replace its tort system with one of workers’ compensation 
for industrial accidents, while another that is primarily agricultural might 
find the additional administrative burden not worth the trouble.  It is true 
 
 10. A classic statement of the common law principle of riparian rights is found in 
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).  Western 
states generally follow the principle of prior appropriation.  TARLOCK, CORBRIDGE, & 
GETCHES, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 149 (4th ed. 1993). 
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that a single government can adopt varying rules from one region to 
another, but in doing so, it must process more information, and deal with 
more constituencies, than a lower level of government.11 
While the Constitution’s structure mainly leaves the question of 
private rights to the states, it does take one crucial step that grants some 
authority to a higher level government, one designed to produce a 
carefully calculated form of integration of the disparate parts of this 
Union.  The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV ensures that 
citizens of every state may do business in every other state and enjoy the 
same civil rights of property and contract that the state’s own citizens 
enjoy.12  This Clause licenses variety while leveraging the ability of 
democracies to make law that is congenial to those who will live under 
it.  And it deals with the pathology of discrimination against inadequately 
represented outsiders by giving those outsiders the benefits that the 
insiders have devised for themselves.  In a stroke, it produces many of 
the advantages of a uniform national private law without adopting one or 
empowering the national legislature to do so.13 
So far, I have stressed the states’ side of federalism, emphasizing the 
argument in favor of leaving them to make most of the law that produces 
a free economy.  The other key component of federalism is the limited 
empowerment of the national government.  A few rules of property and 
contract are to be made by the national legislature, and these exceptions 
show the design underlying the rule.  Congress has power to create two 
 
 11. Students of the American constitutional system will immediately respond to 
this argument in favor of decentralization by thinking of THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James 
Madison), and Madison’s famous argument that a territorially larger government will 
more fully secure private rights than will a smaller, less extended polity.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).  Those who believe Madison should rest easy, and 
perhaps think that the Framers who rejected his scheme for a national veto were 
foresighted.  Madison’s argument is about pure, not relative, scale.  He maintained that a 
larger country would have more contending factions to counteract one another, and more 
individuals of virtue to manage them, than would a smaller country.  Madison believed, 
or at least had to claim, that this country in 1787 was large enough to accomplish his 
goal.  The United States in that year had less than half the population of the City of New 
York today.  Even small governmental units have long since become large enough to 
satisfy his requirements. 
 12. Article IV provides that “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 
cl. 1.  “Derived, like the Commerce Clause, from the fourth of the Articles of 
Confederation, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to create a national 
economic union.  It is therefore not surprising that this Court repeatedly has found that 
‘one of the privileges which the Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing 
business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of that State.’”  
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279–80 (1985) (citation omitted). 
 13. Of course, this approach does not achieve all the advantages of uniformity.  
But it makes possible the advantages of non-uniformity, while leaving the states free to 
obtain the benefits of pure coordination voluntarily, as they have often done. 
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specified forms of intellectual property: patents and copyrights.14  The 
Constitution thereby enlists a national market to provide incentives for 
art and invention while avoiding the difficulties and possibilities for 
local exploitation that would arise were every work of art to need a 
copyright, or every invention a patent, in every state.  Without such national 
power, Rhode Island could become a haven for infringers without 
violating its obligations under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
allowing citizens and noncitizens alike to publish pirated works and 
duplicate patented devices.  Even without bad behavior, authors and 
inventors would be deterred by the prospect of complying with the laws 
of each state separately. 
Congress also has some authority with respect to contract law—and 
economic affairs more broadly—authority that once again illuminates 
the many areas in which Congress has none.  The commerce power 
extends to commercial relations that cross lines of sovereignty, be they 
those of a state, of the United States, or of the quasi-sovereign Indian 
tribes—some of which were more than just quasi-sovereign when the 
Constitution was adopted.15  It enables Congress to provide uniform 
rules of commercial law—though exactly how far it reaches in that 
respect is unclear—but the commerce power’s more important function 
is to eliminate a collective action problem that the states otherwise 
would have.  Left to their own devices, they would be tempted to impose 
restrictions on importation and exportation, and possibly on businesses 
conducting such commerce out of state, in order to prefer local 
production and business.  Congress can replace or simply override laws 
that discriminate in that fashion.  Commercial laws of New York that 
discriminate between Albany and Rochester, by contrast, are left to the 
voters of New York. 
Congress also has power over contracts at the back end, as it were, 
power that once again illuminates the larger design.  It can adopt uniform 
rules of bankruptcy, and thereby coordinate the claims of creditors, who 
may be from any state or another country, and enable discharges that 
will be respected throughout the United States.16  Once again, this power 
yields the benefits of uniformity—purchased with its costs—and bars 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 15. Article I provides that Congress has the power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, among the states, and with the Indian tribes.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
3. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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some forms of state defection.  States would be tempted to favor their 
own, be they debtors or creditors, by granting bankruptcy relief generously 
for debtors or refusing to recognize it against creditors.  A state 
with disproportionately many members of one group might adopt a 
nondiscriminatory approach to bankruptcy that nevertheless is hostile to 
outsiders. 
Free economies need a stable currency in addition to rules of property 
and contract.  The Constitution authorizes Congress to supply one by 
giving it the exclusive power to coin money and the preemptive power to 
specify the dollar value of coin.17 
As that last observation reminds us, the Constitution goes beyond 
forming the states into a federal union and creating a general government 
with certain specified powers.18  It also imposes explicit restrictions on 
the states, restrictions in addition to those imposed by their own 
constitutions.19  Some of those restrictions complement affirmative grants of 
power to the national government by making those grants exclusive or 
partly so.  Only the President and Senate may enter into a commercial 
treaty, not New Jersey alone, because states are forbidden from making 
treaties.20  They may not intrude into that national sphere, just as they 
may not confuse matters by coining their own money.21 
Other restrictions on the states, however, are of the kind especially 
familiar to constitutional practice today, and limit government power 
rather than allocating it only to one level.  States may not make anything 
other than gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor may they 
impair the obligation of contracts.22  They are thus sharply limited in 
their ability to adopt debtor relief legislation.  The ban on tender laws 
attacks one well-known tool to that end, while the more general Contracts 
Clause secures existing contractual obligations against legislative alteration.23 
In doing so, the Contracts Clause adopts the Constitution’s characteristic 
strategy of protecting nonconstitutional private rights without creating 
them itself.  The Constitution does not determine which contracts, if any, 
 
 17. Congress has power to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of 
foreign coins, and the states are forbidden to coin money.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5; 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 19. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. The Constitution’s provisions concerning state legal tender laws and related 
legislation are discussed in Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 417–18 (1830), and 
the Contracts Clause is discussed in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 
123 (1819). 
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have legal obligation.24  More generally, it does not prescribe a law of 
contracts.  Rather, it assumes that the states will have one, and blocks a 
dangerous mode of changing it.  It thus uses a nonconstitutional baseline, 
here one located in time, in order to secure economic liberty without 
directly legislating on the topic. 
Through selective grants of power to Congress, and limitations on the 
states that still leave them with very broad discretion as to the content of 
private rights, the Constitution was set up to promote a free and 
successful national economy while saying hardly anything about the 
content of the legal infrastructure that would support it. 
Congress is not the only branch of the national government, and its 
powers are not the entire story of that government’s role in supporting a 
free economy.  Even the best rules of property and contract will produce 
disputes, so the quality and impartiality of dispute resolution is important to 
economic liberty.  Article III, which sets out the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, can in large measure be justified on the grounds that it too fosters 
economic liberty.25  Much of the Article III jurisdiction is implicitly 
about trade.  The admiralty jurisdiction overwhelmingly is so, and diversity 
jurisdiction applies to disputes between citizens of different states, or 
between Americans and foreigners, that are very likely to arise from 
interstate and international business dealings.26  Such cases would tempt 
state courts to misbehave, favoring their own against outsiders, and 
thereby threatening either the harmony of the Union or its relations with 
foreign countries. 
Here too the Constitution’s approach is more modest than it could be.  
One way to deal with such bias would be to take the substance of the law 
out of the hands of the states, by restricting them or empowering 
Congress or even directly adopting the substance of the law in the 
Constitution.  Instead, the drafters of Article III took for granted a 
 
 24. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 215 (1827) (finding that state law, not the 
Constitution, creates the obligation that contracts may not be impaired). 
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 26. Article III extends the judicial power of the United States to “all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction; . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States . . . 
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”  
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  The particular treaty that the Framers most had in mind 
with the treaty-based jurisdiction, the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, was important 
mainly because of its clause protecting the rights of British creditors in the United States.  
Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80. 
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relatively benign lawmaking process, and dealt with possible bias in 
adjudication by providing unbiased adjudicators.27  They provided for 
the creation of federal courts staffed with life-tenured judges selected by 
the national government—and with no participation by the only directly 
elected part thereof, the House of Representatives.28  Article III enables 
Congress to give those courts extensive jurisdiction over cases implicating 
economic transactions, but the grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts 
did not entail a grant of law-making power either to those courts or to 
Congress. 
II.  SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE 
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
As I have described it, the Constitution’s protection of economic 
liberty is real, but in an important sense, indirect.  Not only does the 
Federal Constitution not itself contain the fundamental rules of property 
and contract that are the foundation of economic activity and interaction, 
it allows the states enormous leeway in deciding what their rules on 
those topics shall be.  And while it gives Congress only limited powers 
in this area and others, it leaves the national legislature with very broad 
policy discretion in the exercise of those powers. 
My description of the Constitution, and the justification I have 
suggested, involves very little of what most people today would think of 
as constitutional protection: affirmative restrictions in favor of the 
interest being served—here private property and free markets.  That 
omission reflects the fact that the extent to which the Constitution 
contains such limitations is a matter of controversy, and so a description 
of well-accepted aspects of the system cannot assume their existence. 
Here I will advance the interpretive claim that in fact the Constitution 
contains very little by way of restrictions on government in favor of 
economic rights.  In particular, I believe that neither Congress nor the 
states are subject to a general requirement that their laws governing 
economic rights and activity, or any of their other laws, be reasonable.  
States may severely limit freedom of contract and choose the extent to 
which property shall be held privately or by the government itself.  
Congress may exercise its regulatory powers, for example, over interstate 
business transactions, in a way that gravely restricts those transactions. 
Students of Professor Siegan’s work will recognize that here I part 
company with him, and with Professor Richard Epstein, another contributor 
to this symposium and the foremost exponent today of the position that 
 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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he shares with Professor Siegan and that I do not.29  Professor Siegan 
believed in particular that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposes strong limits on the discretion of the states with respect to rights 
of property and contract.  Of Section One’s components, the most plausible 
vehicle for the imposition of such limits is the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, as it is the part that refers most directly to rights of property and 
contract.  Those rights were routinely referred to as privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the nineteenth century, and are protected from 
discrimination by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.30 
As David Currie explained, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
originally understood to perform the function now attributed to the Equal 
Protection Clause.31  By requiring that every state accord all of its 
citizens the same civil rights, it was thought to forbid discriminatory 
legislation like the southern Black Codes and to write into the 
Constitution the anti-discrimination rule of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.32  If that is correct, the Fourteenth Amendment follows the now 
familiar strategy of identifying a nonconstitutional baseline of private 
rights.  Indeed, its Privileges or Immunities Clause closely resembles 
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.  Both extend to a less favored 
group the civil rights that the nonconstitutional law accords to a more 
favored group.  Article IV gives Americans from other states the rights 
of state citizens.33  The Fourteenth Amendment gives citizens who have 
been discriminated against, paradigmatically blacks and freed slaves, the 
rights of those who are not discriminated against because they make the 
laws, paradigmatically free white citizens.34  Neither provision requires 
that the Constitution itself say what those civil rights are, yet each 
protects them, and the economic liberty they provide. 
 
 29. Professor Siegan’s views were set out most fully in BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE 
SUPREME COURT’S CONSTITUTION (1987).  Those of Professor Epstein are found in many 
works, most notably RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
 30. A classic discussion by Justice Washington on circuit of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, and the legal advantages it protects, is found in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 
Fed. Cas. 546, 549 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
 31. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS 1789–1888, at 347–51 (1985); see also John Harrison, Reconstructing 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992). 
 32. Harrison, supra note 31, at 1402–04, 1414–24. 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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It is thus true that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects 
economic liberty, and indeed rights of property and contract.  Those are 
indeed the stuff of citizenship.  But it does not do so the way the First 
Amendment protects the freedom of speech.35  It does so in a way consistent 
with both federalism and the capacity of nonconstitutional decisionmakers 
to change legal rules to adjust to changing circumstances. 
Professor Siegan did not share this view of the Fourteenth Amendment.36  
He believed not only that it protects rights of property and contract, but 
that it goes beyond equality and substantively constrains state law.  It 
seems likely to me that he reached that conclusion by combining a 
widely shared but erroneous premise with a correct premise.  The widely 
shared but erroneous assumption, adopted by the Supreme Court in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, is that the provision is substantive like the First 
Amendment.37  The correct assumption is that the privileges and immunities 
that it shields include economic rights.  Put those two together and you 
have a plausible but incorrect interpretation. 
Despite that argument’s appeal, it is unlikely that the Clause has a 
substantive aspect insofar as it relates to economic rights in general.38  
The Clause forbids the states from abridging the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.  The most common textual route to a 
substantive reading is to argue that whatever else it does, the Clause 
protects rights of distinctively national citizenship, as even Slaughter 
House agrees.39  Next comes the more adventurous move: to say that 
United States citizenship brings with it the most basic rights, including, 
for example, the right to earn a living. 
But it does not, because of American federalism and the related 
principle of enumerated federal power.  As I have emphasized, the 
Constitution left basic questions of property and contract, and indeed 
bodily integrity and self ownership, to the states and their law.40  The 
 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 36. For example, Professor Siegan endorsed the level of protection of contract 
rights associated with Lochner.  SIEGAN, supra note 1, at 81. 
 37. The Court in the Slaughter-House Cases found that the Clause provides 
substantive protection, but only to the rights of distinctively national citizenship.  
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873).  An example of a substantive 
reading of the Clause in which its protections are not so limited is John C. Eastman, Re-
evaluating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 123 (2003). 
 38. By putting it that way, I mean to exclude the question of incorporation of the 
Federal Bill of Rights against the states; the first eight Amendments do deal with 
property rights, but that is not what I am concerned with here. 
 39. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873). 
 40. It may seem that I am arguing in a circle and that the question is whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes rights of property and contract into rights of national 
citizenship.  There is an argument, but no circle.  In fuller form, my reasoning is as 
follows: Absent the Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution allocates to the national 
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most striking sign of this is the limited grant of powers to Congress, a 
grant that does not include, for example, authority to adopt a national 
law about the acquisition and transfer of real estate.  In a system of 
federalism like this one, rights of national citizenship are those that are 
either granted by the national constitution or about which the national 
legislature may legislate.  Patents and copyrights are associated with 
national citizenship, but real estate is not. 
As the example of intellectual property points out, to say that basic 
economic rights come with national and not state citizenship would 
imply that the states may not legislate about them at all, not that state 
legislation is somehow limited.  Patent holders have the rights that 
Congress gives them, no matter what state law may provide.41  If the 
Fourteenth Amendment somehow transforms all property rights into 
accompaniments of national citizenship, then it strips the states of any 
control over them.  This point is the flip side of Justice Field’s argument 
in Slaughter House that the protection of distinctively national rights 
could not have been the point of the Amendment, because the Supremacy 
Clause already accomplishes that goal; Field was right about that.42  It 
does not, however, empower Congress to supply the missing legal 
content.  Section Five authorizes the national legislature to enforce the 
prohibition on the states; it does not provide for the creation of a national 
code of private law, nor does the Constitution do so elsewhere. 
Americans have two citizenships, as the Fourteenth Amendment itself 
recognizes.43  The allocation of individual rights between those two 
citizenships reflects the allocation of legislative authority between the 
two levels of government.  When Justice Miller, to the amusement of 
 
government very little power concerning basic civil rights, and so leaves the vast bulk of 
that power with the states.  In referring to privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States, the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not purport to create any new 
rights; it points to those that otherwise exist.  It has no language conferring or defining 
rights and refers to a body of legal advantages that exist without it. 
 41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 42. Justice Field argued that if the Privileges or Immunities Clause was limited to 
protecting rights of distinctively national citizenship, it was pointless because state 
interference with such rights already was forbidden by the Supremacy Clause of Article 
VI.  “With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied [by national citizenship] 
no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was 
required to inhibit such interference.  The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States always controlled any State legislation of that character.”  Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. at 96. 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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subsequent readers, listed access to the navigable waters of the United 
States as a privilege of national citizenship in Slaughter House, he was 
not seeking to mock the plaintiffs’ argument or give them cold comfort.44  
He was giving an example of a subject matter governed by national 
legislative power—maritime commerce—private rights as to which were 
therefore likewise national.  More broadly speaking, Miller’s list reflects 
his understanding of the allocation of sovereignty between the states and 
the United States.  National citizenship and national sovereignty go together, 
as state citizenship and state sovereignty go together. 
Faced with the Constitution’s allocation of most private rights to state 
authority, proponents of the claim that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause imposes substantive constraints on the state law of private rights 
may adopt a different approach, one that begins by agreeing that property 
rights are mainly matters for state law, state sovereignty, and state 
citizenship.  The next step then would be to say that the national Constitution, 
to some extent, determines the legal rights that come with state citizenship, 
while not associating those rights with national citizenship.  Although 
that might seem a strange way of going about things, it is not simply 
inconceivable.  The Constitution takes steps to ensure that state legislatures 
will remain republican without thereby turning them into Congress.45 
Although the Constitution could do that, the text of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause does not.  Its structure is parallel to similar provisions 
that deal with abridgements by the states of rights under state law, 
including the provisions about voting like the Nineteenth Amendment.46  
It refers to a body of legal advantages found in state law, the privileges 
and immunities of (state) citizenship and directs that the states not 
abridge them.  The Nineteenth Amendment forbids the states from 
abridging the right of citizens of the United States to vote on account of 
sex.47  One important feature of the Constitution is that it does not 
prescribe the qualifications of voters generally, and in particular, does 
not prescribe the qualification of voters for state office.  Rather, it takes 
those qualifications so much for granted that it uses them as the measure 
of voting in federal elections: voters for the House, and now for the 
Senate, are those who are qualified to vote for the most numerous branch 
 
 44. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79. 
 45. The Guarantee Clause charges the United States with ensuring that every state 
has a republican form of government, but does not do so by consolidating the states into 
the Republic that the Constitution creates.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 46. The Nineteenth Amendment forbids states and the United States from abridging 
citizens’ right to vote on the basis of sex, but it does not purport to confer the right to 
vote.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 47. Id. 
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of the state legislature.48  If the Constitution dictated the content of the 
right to vote for state legislatures, it would not proceed in so roundabout 
a fashion.  The Nineteenth Amendment thus takes for granted that there 
is a body of state law about voter qualifications, a body of law that gives 
rise to something called the right to vote.49  It does not confer on anyone 
the right to vote; state law does that.  The Nineteenth Amendment does 
constrain state law in one respect, providing that the right to vote as 
defined thereby may not be denied to U.S. citizens on account of sex. 
Under the equality-based reading, the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
takes just this approach.  The Federal Constitution refers to, but does not 
determine the content of, rights under state law.  If the Clause were 
designed to tell the states the content of their law, a very serious step in a 
federal system, it would be formulated more affirmatively.  It might say, 
for example, each state shall secure the right to contract.  But in keeping 
with basic assumptions about the role of the states and the nation, 
including the national Constitution, it does not do so. 
III.  THE DECLINE OF LIMITED FEDERAL POWER TO REGULATE 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
So far my discussion of the Constitution has had two features.  First, it 
has been mainly descriptive—in Section II, argumentatively so as the 
description I urge is not universally agreed with.  I have discussed how 
the Constitution pursues a particular goal, not how well it does so, and 
so have been descriptive rather than evaluative.  Second, this description 
has been of the system one can read from the text with some historical 
context, not of the system that is actually in place. 
Those questions, about efficacy and change over time, are related to 
one another.  On the question of evaluation, a symposium dedicated to 
the legacy of Professor Siegan naturally invites the question: would a 
constitution better pursue its goal—in particular, the goal of protecting 
economic liberty—more directly?  Would it be better for the Constitution 
simply to dictate basic rules about property, contract, and economic 
interactions, with perhaps a little bit of flexibility, than to pursue the 
highly indirect strategy I have attributed to the text? 
 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (discussing the qualifications for electors for 
House); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1 (discussing the qualifications for electors for 
Senate). 
 49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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Probably not, I think.  Constitutions are, by design, strongly entrenched; 
they are quite hard to change, and are supposed to be hard to change.  In 
this country, the courts play a large role in enforcing the Constitution, 
which means that they give content to constitutional standards.  
Sometimes they even give content to constitutional rules, but I think, and 
hope, that happens less often. 
Combine those facts and you have a dilemma for any policy of 
constitutionalization.  Rules are relatively clear in their application, but 
they purchase their clarity by a rigidity that has serious drawbacks.  
Rules interact with the world to produce results.  They must therefore be 
based on assumptions about how the world will respond, and the less 
flexible the rule, the more it depends on the accuracy of those assumptions.  
If the world changes, the rule may produce unintended results.  The 
Constitution’s designers were prepared to tolerate some deviation from 
the political equality of citizens in the interest of state sovereignty.  The 
compromise in the voting rules for the House and Senate demonstrates 
this.50  But today we have a much greater deviation: California has the 
same number of Senators as Wyoming, and more than seventy times the 
population.51  As times change, inflexible rules are likely to produce 
results at odds with the purposes they serve. 
One natural solution to the need for flexibility is to replace rules with 
standards.  Instead of adopting the law of contract as it stood in 1787, the 
Constitution could have said something more general but still designed 
substantially to constrain subordinate lawmakers.  Standards are delegations 
to future lawmakers and, with respect to the Constitution, the future 
lawmakers are frequently the courts.52  To the extent that it constitutionalized 
the law of contract, for example, the Constitution would have been 
giving the courts the power to make the law of contract, subject to little 
or no revision by the legislature. 
Delegating power in that fashion would not, of course, eliminate 
political controversies over the content of the law of contract.  It would 
only displace them from legislatures to courts, and therefore increase the 
importance of policy considerations in the selection of judges.  Anyone 
who thinks it would be a good idea for the Supreme Court of the United 
 
 50. Representation in the House of Representatives is based on population, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (now modified by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2), while each 
state has two Senators, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 51. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2008, at 17 (noting that California’s population in 2006 was 
approximately 36,458,000; Wyoming’s was approximately 515,000). 
 52. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139–41 (William N. Eskridge & 
Phillip Frickey eds., 1994) (discussing the difference between rules and standards). 
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States to be the legislature for the private law of this country, and hence, 
for example, the legislature for the law of medical malpractice, should 
think about what Supreme Court confirmations would be like if that 
were true.  Hot button social issues are one thing; multibillion-dollar 
distributional struggles are another. 
As I indicated, the preceding observation is related to the point that the 
Constitution one reads is not the Constitution we have.  Most important 
among the changes is that the national legislature, at least when it comes 
to economic questions, is not one of enumerated powers.  It has general 
authority to regulate the economy, and to redistribute the economy’s 
fruits through taxation and expenditure. 
That there should have been so much change may or may not be good, 
but it should not be surprising.  The enumeration of the powers of the 
national government is the most substantive part of the Constitution.  
Most of the rest is about the selection and tenure of officials, the 
relations between different branches of government, and so forth.  The 
enumerated powers are also fairly rule-like, identifying pretty specific 
matters as to which Congress may legislate, like intellectual property 
and post offices. 
Imperfectly, that list of powers implements a theory of what should be 
decided centrally in an extended republic, as of 1787.  I say imperfectly, 
because the list is somewhat haphazard, derived in part from historical 
accidents as much as anything.  That is not to say that it is just a 
hodgepodge, but it is to say that it reflected only limited thinking about 
the basic problem.  The Federal Convention looked at the problems that 
had arisen under the Articles, mainly national insolvency, national military 
weakness, and conflicts among the states about trade policy—internal 
and external—and came up with powers aimed at those specific problems.53  
That is usually how constitutions are made. 
Then over the decades, lots of things changed, and lots of people came 
to believe that the old list did not make as much sense as it once had.  
What happens in a democracy when large and stable majorities decide 
that they do not like the provisions of the Constitution?  If they have the 
time and are willing to make the effort, they will change the Constitution’s 
text.  But our Constitution presents a tempting alternative.  Formal 
 
 53. Rakove discusses the deficiencies of the Articles that gave rise to the Federal 
Convention.  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 23–34 (1996).  The Framers’ response with respect to the powers of 
the new government are found primarily in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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amendments are difficult because of the required super majorities at the 
state level.54  It can be a lot easier to cut out the states as such, and simplify 
the process, by operating entirely inside the national government.  Stable 
majorities in Congress and the presidency can adopt legislation that 
seems desirable and appoint judges who will approve it. 
The process by which the country has come to the current principles 
governing federal power, however, has serious weaknesses.  Because 
that process has operated through the adoption and judicial endorsement 
of statutes creating new federal programs, and not through the adoption 
of a constitutional amendment that would codify new views concerning 
the desirable role of the federal government, particular questions of 
policy have been bound up with the more general question of the 
allocation of authority among levels of government.  It is entirely 
possible that if Congress deliberated on a constitutional amendment that 
would bring federalism into the twenty-first century, it would produce a 
text more restrictive than the current de facto Constitution.  Certainly 
such an amendment would authorize social security, but it might well 
give the states more autonomy with respect to environmental policy. 
There is reason to believe, then, that the Framers’ judgment about the 
proper malleability of the Constitution was wrong, or is no longer 
correct, at least with respect to the allocation of power between the states 
and the national government, which is the aspect of the Constitution that 
bears most directly on economic liberty.  Precisely because the most 
desirable higher order rules on that subject change with changes in the 
economy, the extremely strong entrenchment that the Constitution 
provides leads not to inflexibility, but to flexibility that operates through 
the ordinary legislative process and the process of appointing judges and 
Justices.  That is undesirable. 
Quite possibly the best constitutional arrangement would provide for 
multiple levels of entrenchment, with some rules that are highly resistant 
to change and others, probably including those governing the allocation 
of power between the levels of government, that are substantially sticky 
but not as much as Article V makes the Constitution.55  That way, each 
generation could adapt the Constitution to its own needs with rules that 
would be stable for decades but change over the centuries, and could do 
so through explicit acts of popular sovereignty, not dodgy mechanisms 
 
 54. Constitutional amendments must be ratified by three-fourths of the states.  U.S. 
CONST. art. V.  As Keith Whittington points out, President Franklin Roosevelt was well 
aware of both the ease with which state level minorities could block constitutional 
amendments and the power of changes in judicial attitudes to change constitutional 
doctrine.  KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 47–
48, 63–64 (2006). 
 55. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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involving judicial validation of doubtful statutes.  The Earth belongs to 
the living, and so does the Constitution. 
That document as I have described it, an essentially structural instrument 
that regulates a ramified legal and governmental system that it largely 
takes for granted, could be called Henry Hart’s Constitution.  In addition, 
some of it, I think, and one important aspect of it, I know, can be described 
as David Currie’s Constitution.  Appeals to authority are common in 
law, and often appropriate, and I will without hesitation appeal to the 
late Professor Currie’s authority.  John Heminge and Henry Condell, 
editors of the First Folio of Shakespeare’s plays, gave advice that also 
applies with respect to Currie: “Read him, therefore; and again, and 


























 56. THE NORTON FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST FOLIO OF SHAKESPEARE 7 (2d ed. 1996) 
(spelling modernized). 
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